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A Scalable Trust Management scheme For Mobile 
Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) 
Mobile ad hoc networks MANETs, have special resource 
requirements and different topology features, they establish 
themselves on fly without reliance on centralized or specialized 
entities such as base stations. All the nodes must cooperate with each 
other in order to send packets, forwarding packets, responding to 
routing messages, sending recommendations, among others, 
Cooperating nodes must trust each other.  
In MANETs, an untrustworthy node can wreak considerable damage 
and adversely affect the quality and reliability of data. Therefore, 
analyzing the trust level of a node has a positive influence on the 
confidence with which an entity conducts transactions with that node. 
This thesis presents a new trust management scheme to assign trust 
levels for spaces or nodes in ad hoc networks. The scheme emulates 
the human model which depends on the previous individual 
experience and on the intercession or recommendation of other spaces 
in the same radio range. The trust level considers the recommendation 
of trustworthy neighbors and their own experience. For the 
recommendation computation, we take into account not only the trust 
level, but also its accuracy and the relationship maturity. The 
relationship rationality -maturity-, allows nodes to improve the 
efficiency of the proposed model for mobile scenarios.     
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We also introduce the Contribution Exchange Protocol (CEP) which 
allows nodes to exchange Intercessions and recommendation about 
their neighbors without disseminating the trust information over the 
entire network. Instead, nodes only need to keep and exchange trust 
information about nodes within the radio range. Without the need for a 
global trust knowledge. 
Different from most related works, this scheme improves scalability 
by restricting nodes to keep and exchange trust information solely 
with direct neighbors, that is, neighbors within the radio range. 
We have developed a simulator, which is specifically designed for this 
model, in order to evaluate and identify the main characteristics of the 
proposed system. Simulation results show the correctness of this 
model in a single-hop network. Extending the analysis to mobile 
multihop networks, shows the benefits of the maturity relationship 
concept, i.e. for how long nodes know each other, the maturity 
parameter can decrease the trust level error up to 50%. 
The results show the effectiveness of the system and the influence of 
main parameters in the presence of mobility. At last, we analyze the 
performance of the CEP protocol and show its scalability. We show 










Chapter One: Introduction 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) had become largely used for 
personal  use: e.g., personal  area network  (PAN),  for short-range  
communication  of  user  devices,  wireless  local  area   network 
(WLAN),  and  in-house  digital  network  (IHDN), for  video  and  
audio  data exchange, as shown in Fig. 1.1. 
 
1.1 Development of Mobile Ad hoc Networks 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-configuring wireless 
network in which the routers can move and organize themselves 
arbitrarily [25]. Although ad hoc networking was first defined by 
IEEE in 802.11 protocol set, the concept can be traced back to the 
Packet Radio Network (PRNet) projects in 1972 [26]. Because a 
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MANET does not rely on the infrastructure and central management 
like the traditional Internet-like networks, it is deemed as a promising 
solution to support highly decentralized or mobile applications. 
A MANET is a collection  of self-organizing, peer-to-peer mobile 
nodes with dynamic topologies and no fixed infrastructure [27,28], 
which form a particular class of multi-hop networks, it is composed 
usually of tens to hundreds  of mobile  nodes, which equipped with 
wireless communication devices. The  nodes  have  transmission 
ranges of up to hundreds  of meters and each individual  node must be 
able to act both as a host, which generates user and application traffic, 
and as a router which carries out network control and routing 
protocols [29], as shown in Fig. 1.2. 
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A self-configuring and self-organizing wireless network shown in Fig. 
1.3, has two mechanisms implemented: 
 discovery of routes between pair of nodes and, 
 update the current topology, by first detecting the node or link 
failures and secondly by optimizing the routes obtained 
through discovery. 







The discovery mechanism can be done proactively, when routes 
between any pairs of nodes are sought, periodically, or on-demand, 
when only certain routes are required. On updating the current 
topology, either single or multiple routes are maintained between a 
pair of nodes. 
1.2 Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
In a MANET, nodes are free to move randomly and organize 
themselves arbitrarily; thus, the network’s wireless topology may 
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change rapidly and unpredictably. In such networks, communication is 
achieved by forwarding packets via intermediate nodes on routes that 
link the source and the destination. Routes are typically determined by 
using on-demand routing protocols, such as the Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) [30] or the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector 
Routing (AODV) [31], that generate routing information only when a 
source node initiates a transmission.  
Two nodes in a MANET can communicate in a bidirectional manner 
if and only if the distance between them is at most the minimum of 
their transmission ranges. When a node wants to communicate with a 
node outside its transmission range, a multi-hop routing strategy is 
used which involves some intermediate nodes to forward their 









The transmission of a mobile host is received by all hosts within its 
transmission range due to the broadcast nature of wireless 
communication and Omni-directional antennae. 
1.3 Broadcast in Ad Hoc Networks 
Nodes in a MANET do not have a priori knowledge of the network 
topology. They have to discover it. A node will find its local topology 
by broadcasting its presence, and listening to broadcast 
announcements from its neighbors. As time goes on, each node gets to 
know about all other nodes and finds one or more ways to reach them. 
End-to-end communication in a MANET does not rely on any 
underlying static network infrastructure but requires routing via 
several intermediate nodes. 
Nodes discover network topology using Neighbor Coverage–Based 
(NCB) Broadcast, nodes periodically or dynamically broadcast beacon 
messages to advertise their own existence and also discover the 
existence of neighboring nodes within the transmission range (one 
hop). Beacon messages may typically contain the broadcasting node’s 
address and the neighboring nodes that the node may be aware of. 
Thus, the information of neighbor topology within two hops can to be 
obtained. 
The exchange of beacon messages allows for attaching additional 
information about neighboring nodes. The additional information may 
include a node’s remaining battery power, any user-based constraint, 
physical coordinates acquired through a GPS device, signal-to-noise 
6  
ratio (SNR) measurements (acquired from the MAC layer), and 
possible device characteristics such as maximum broadcast power. 
The simplest NCB mechanisms are ‘‘Self-Pruning’’ [32] and 
‘‘Neighbor Coverage’’ [33]. Both mechanisms are equivalent. Two 
neighbor sets are maintained at each node. Suppose node i broadcasts 
a message to node j. Set Ni and Nj denote the neighbors of node i and 
j, respectively. When node j receives a broadcast packet from a node i 
for the first time, it determines its coverage set as follows: 
Cj =  Nj _ Ni _ {i}. 
The resulting coverage set Cj is the set of neighbors of node j, which 
are not covered by node i yet. This keeps track of pending hosts in j’s 
neighborhood, which have not received a direct broadcast from node i 
as they are outside node i’s broadcast range. Node j does not 
rebroadcast the packet if Cj is an empty set. 
An empty set implies that all neighbors of node j are also neighbors of 
node i. This calculation is performed on each node that receives a 
broadcast packet prior to rebroadcasting. Nodes must share the 
wireless communication medium efficiently. 
1.4 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks applications 
Minimal configuration, Absence of infrastructure, and Quick 
deployment make MANETs convenient for use in situations where a 
network infrastructure is unavailable. For example, in some business 
environments, the need for collaborative computing might be more 
important outside the office environment than inside.  
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A MANET can also be used to provide crisis management services 
applications, such as in disaster recovery, where the entire 
communication infrastructure is destroyed and re-establishing 
communication quickly is crucial.   
MANETs are attractive in military and emergency response 
applications, such as rapid network formation, extended operating 
range, and survivability. The attractiveness of these networks lies in 
the fact that unlike other wireless networks, ad hoc networks can 
establish themselves on fly without reliance on centralized or 
specialized entities such as base stations, and they formed dynamically 
in response to some immediate operational requirement.  
1.5 The Problem Statement 
MANETs by their very nature are more vulnerable to internal as well 
as external attacks than wired networks. The flexibility provided by 
the open broadcast medium and the cooperativeness of the mobile 
devices (which have generally different resource and computational 
capacities, and run usually on battery power) introduces new security 
risks, since they obstruct the assumption of centralized or distributed 
online trusted authorities. Perhaps, the fundamental question that 
needs to be addressed in MANET is: 
 How to enable a mobile node to enlist trusted intermediate mobile 
nodes so that they can cooperate in forwarding the information to a 
target without modifying the information or obstructing the operation 
of other mobile nodes.  
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This advocates that the security of MANET heavily relies on the 
presence of a trustworthy secure communication layer so that services 
can be delivered at the higher layers. 
Initially, several secure routing protocols [34,35] have been developed 
to deliver secure routes by authenticating intermediate nodes and 
verifying the integrity of routing messages. Data transmissions can 
then be protected using the secure routes discovered by these 
protocols. However, key management [36,37], which is the basis for 
proper functioning of secure routing, is difficult to achieve, especially 
in the absence of centralized authority due to dynamically changing 
topology and resulting broken links and sporadic connections. Since 
secure routing protocols are only designed to prevent against 
predefined attacks and assume all available nodes to perform routing 
and network management, they are prone to overlook the correct 
execution of critical network functions such as packet forwarding. For 
this reason, secure routing protocols fail to enforce cooperation among 
nodes . 
The main reason for the shortcoming of secure routing systems is that 
they fail to measure the trustworthiness of nodes based on the latter’s 
dynamically changing behavior. Therefore, a mechanism that allows a 
node to infer the trustworthiness of other nodes based on their 
behaviors becomes necessary [2,3]. All these have eventually led to 
the growth of trust management systems [38-43], which are 
synonymously referred as detection reaction and reputation systems in 
the literature. Since trust management systems proactively detect and 
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reactively isolate (or select) malicious (or benign) nodes, these 
systems are also known as self-policing systems [39].   
1.6  WHAT IS TRUST?              
Trust can be reflected by reliability, utility, availability, reputation, 
risk, confidence, quality of services and other concepts. Nevertheless, 
none of these concepts can accurately describe the definition of trust. 
This is because trust is an abstract concept, which combines many 
complicated factors [7]. 
Trust which is the prediction of a node’s future action based on the 
node’s past actions plays an important factor that could improve the 
number of successful data transmission process, by deciding from 
where to get a file, what service provider to contact, what access rights 
to grant, trust enables entities to cope with uncertainty and 
uncontrollability. 
One of the principle problems with trust is the variety of meanings 
that have been associated with it. For example, in [8], Josang defines 
trust as a belief that one entity holds about another entity, based on 
past experiences, knowledge of entity behavior and/or 
recommendations from trusted entities. McKnight and Chervany 
define trust as the situation where one is willing to depend, or intends 
to depend, on another party with a feeling of relative security, in spite 
of lack of control over that party, and even though negative 
consequences may arise [9]. However, both these definitions 
predominately focus on aspects of human-mediated trust relations, it is 
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not immediately obvious how such a definition translates to 
autonomous computer networks.  
Compounding this issue are the problems with the related concepts of 
trusted and trustworthy which are often used, but rarely clearly 
defined, (trustworthy; mean that there is a high probability that the 
actions the nodes are expected to perform will be done in a manner 
that is favorable to the trustor [10]), In the context of distributed 
systems, Anderson in [11] defines a trusted component as one whose 
failure can break the security policy of the system, while a trustworthy 
component is one that won’t fail. This differs to the prevailing usage 
of these terms in the MANET literature in which a trusted node is one 
in which sufficient trust has been established, while a trustworthy 
node is one that will behave as expected [12]. This notion of behavior, 
and in particular the detection and mitigation of undesirable behavior, 
has received much attention in recent years [13],[12],[14].  
With respect to MANET sense, trust definitions can be classified into 
the following: 
(1) Trust as risk factor: The definition given by Morton Deutsch [15] 
is more widely accepted than many, and states that trusting behavior 
occurs when an individual (node) perceives an ambiguous path, the 
result of which could be good or bad, and the occurrence of the good 
or bad result is contingent on the actions of another person. In [16], 
[17] trust is defined as a bet about the future contingent actions of 
others. 
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(2) Trust as belief: Trust is an individual’s belief and willingness to 
act on the basis of the words, actions, and decisions of another 
[18],[19]. 
(3) Trust as subjective probability: Trust (or distrust) is a particular 
level of subjective probability with which an agent will perform a 
particular action for a specified period within a specified context 
[20],[21]–[22]. 
(4) Trust as transitivity relationship: Trust is a weighted binary 
relation between two members of a network. As an example, consider 
a network of intelligence gathering agents, organized in a hierarchical 
manner. Trust could then be seen as the expectation of a person A 
(presumably high in the hierarchy) that a person B (low in the 
hierarchy) is honest, as opposed, being a double agent [23]. 
We can summarize the definition of trust in the MANETs perspective 
in the following way: The trust of a particular node is a subjective 
assessment by an agent/other peer node on the reliability and accuracy 
of information received from or traversing through that node in a 
given context. Trust reflects the belief or confidence or expectations 
on the honesty, integrity, ability, availability and quality of service of 
target node’s future activity/ behavior. It also reflects the mutual 
relationships where a given node behaves in a trustworthy manner and 
maintains reliable communications only with nodes which are highly 
trusted by the given node. 
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1.7 Trust Management Systems  
Trust management and trustworthy computing are becoming 
increasingly significant in a distributed environment, since they assist 
the systems in making sensible interactions with unknown parties by 
providing a basis for more detailed and automated decisions [43]. The 
concepts, trust and reputation, are closely related in trust management 
systems [45]. 
Trust system can also be used in assessing the quality of received 
information, to provide network security services such as access 
control, authentication, malicious node detections and secure resource 
sharing [4],[5]. An untrustworthy node can fall considerable damage 
and adversely affect the quality and reliability of data, therefore, it is 
important to periodically evaluate the trust value of nodes based on 
some metrics and computational methods, which has a positive 
influence on the confidence with which an entity conducts 
transactions with that node. 
Providing a trust metric to each node is not only useful when nodes 
misbehave, but also when nodes exchange information. According to 
the paradigm of autonomic networks [6], a node should be capable of 
self-configuring, self-managing, and self-learning by means of 
collecting local information and exchanging information with its 
neighbors. Thus, it is important to communicate only with trustworthy 
neighbors, since communicating with misbehaving nodes can 
compromise the autonomy of ad hoc networks. 
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1.7.1 Trust and Reputation 
The concepts, trust and reputation, are closely related in trust 
management systems [24]. Although there is no universal definition 
for these concepts due to their rich connection with different 
disciplines, we confine to computing-oriented definition. In traditional 
trust management systems, trust enables a trustor to reduce uncertainty 
in its future interactions with a trustee, who is beyond the control of 
trustor but whose actions are of interest to the trustor and affects the 
state of trustor. In other words, trust is a subjective probability that 
enables the trustor to take a binary decision by balancing between the 
known risks and the opinion held for trustee. Here, only known risks 
are considered for making decisions as it is difficult to prove unknown 
risks, and the opinion presents the trustor’s relationship with the 
trustee based upon the trustor’s experiences. Other factors that 
influence the decision are time and context, where context accounts 
for the type of interaction between trustor and trustee, and the nature 
of application.  
A reputation system is a system that takes feedback from users and  
provides a mechanism to accumulate and determine the quality (or 
reputation) of a given source based on this feedback. In general, 
reputation is used to evaluate the trust of an entity. The goals of a 
reputation system are [46]: 
 To provide information to distinguish a trustworthy principal 
from an untrustworthy one. 
 To encourage principals to act in a trustworthy manner. 
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 To discourage untrustworthy principals from participating in 
the service that the reputation mechanism protects. 
Reputation mechanisms that are applied to MANETs to address 
threats arising from uncooperative nodes rely on neighbor monitoring 
to dynamically assess the trustworthiness of neighbor nodes and 
exclude untrustworthy nodes. 
Several reputation systems have been proposed to mitigate selfishness 
and stimulate cooperation in MANET, including CONFIDANT [47-
49], CORE [50] and OCEAN [51]. 
In reputation systems, reputation is defined as the opinion held by the 
trustor towards the trustee depending on its past experiences with the 
trustee [24]. In other words, reputation generally represents the 
trustor’s direct relationship with the trustee. Also, trustor’s 
relationship with a second trustee based on its direct relationship with 
a first trustee and the first trustee’s direct relationship with the second 
trustee is known as indirect relationship. This is possible as nodes are 
allowed to share their opinions in the network. 
Although trust and reputation are used interchangeably in MANET, 
we define them as follows since they are shown to complement each 
other from the above discussion. Hence, trust can be defined as the 
prediction of a node’s future action in a context such as forwarding 
routing messages without modification, while reputation then becomes 
the opinion held for the node based on the node’s past actions and the 
one that influences the prediction. For this reason, we consider the 
following trust definition to be more appropriate and timely: ‘‘Trust is 
the firm belief in the competence of an entity to act as expected such 
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that this firm belief is not a fixed value associated with the entity but 
rather subject to the entity’s behavior (reputation held for the entity) 
and applies only within the context and at a given time.’’ . 
1.8 Trust research directions in MANETs 
Trust researches are organized in four major areas: 
1. Policy-based trust: Using policies to establish trust, focused on 
managing and exchanging credentials and enforcing access policies. 
Work in policy-based trust generally assumes that trust is established 
simply by obtaining a sufficient amount of credentials pertaining to a 
specific party, and applying the policies to grant that party certain 
access rights. The recursive problem of trusting the credentials is 
frequently solved by using a trusted third party to serve as an authority 
for issuing and verifying credentials.  
2. Reputation-based trust: Using reputation to establish trust, where 
past interactions or performance for an entity are combined to assess 
its future behavior. Research in reputation-based trust uses the history 
of an entity’s actions/behavior to compute trust, and may use referral-
based trust (information from others) in the absence of (or in addition 
to) first-hand knowledge. In the latter case, work is being done to 
compute trust over social networks (a graph where vertices are people 
and edges denote a social relationship between people), or across 
paths of trust (where two parties may not have direct trust information 
about each other, and must rely on a third party). Recommendations 
are trust decisions made by other users, and combining these decisions 
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to synthesize a new one, often personalized, is another commonly 
addressed problem. 
3. General models of trust: There is a wealth of research on 
modeling and defining trust, its prerequisites, conditions, components, 
and consequences. Trust models are useful for analyzing human and 
agentized trust decisions and for operationalizing computable models 
of trust. Work in modeling trust describes values or factors that play a 
role in computing trust, and leans more on work in psychology and 
sociology for a decomposition of what trust comprises. Modeling 
research ranges from simple access control polices (which specify 
who to trust to access data or resources) to analyses of competence, 
beliefs, risk, importance, utility, etc. These subcomponents underlying 
trust help our understanding of the more subtle and complex aspects 
of composing, capturing, and using trust in a computational setting. 
4. Trust in information resources: Trust is an increasingly common 
theme in Web related research regarding whether Web resources and 
Web sites are reliable. Moreover, trust on the Web has its own range 
of varying uses and meanings, including capturing ratings from users 
about the quality of information and services they have used, how web 
site design influences trust on content and content providers, 
propagating trust over links, etc.. With the advent of the Semantic 
Web, new work in trust is harnessing both the potential gained from 
machine understanding, and addressing the problems of reliance on 
the content available in the web so that agents in the Semantic Web 
can ultimately make trust decisions autonomously. Provenance of 
information is key to support trust decisions, as is automated detection 
of opinions as distinct from objective information. 
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Therefore, a mechanism that allows a node to infer the trustworthiness 
of other nodes in an ad hoc network becomes necessary. 
Providing a trust metric to each node is not only useful when nodes 
misbehave, but also when nodes exchange information. 
According to the paradigm of autonomic networks [72], a node should 
be capable of self-configuring, self-managing, and self-learning by 
means of collecting local information and exchanging information 
with its neighbors. Thus, it is important to communicate only with 
trustworthy neighbors, since communicating with misbehaving nodes 
can compromise the autonomy of ad hoc networks. 
1.9 Thesis Methodology and Objectives  
The fundamental question that this thesis will address is: 
 How to enable a mobile node to enlist trusted intermediate mobile 
nodes so that they can cooperate in forwarding the information to a 
target without modifying the information or obstructing the operation 
of other mobile nodes.  
So the objectives of this thesis will include: 
1- Propose an alternative trust management model by fruitfully 
combine more than one idea which emulate the human trust 
model to improve the trustworthiness of the neighborhood and 
secure the routing procedure. This will help in computing the 
trust in the neighbors, based on previous individual experience 
and the intercession of the others, and then selecting the most 
trustworthiness route from the available ones for the data 
transfer (integrated security solution). 
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2- Introduce a light and simple Contribution Exchange Protocol 
(CEP) which allows nodes to exchange Intercessions about 
their neighbors without disseminating the trust information 
over the entire network. 
 
This research  introduce a flexible trust model based on the concept of 
human trust model, and applies this model to ad hoc networks. The 
trust is based on previous individual experiences and on the 
recommendations of others, A key concept introduced is the 
relationship maturity, which allows spaces to improve the efficiency 
of the proposed model for mobile scenarios.   
The rest of the thesis report is organized as follows: chapter two 
presents and discusses some of the existing trust- and reputation-based 
schemes designed for MANETs. chapter three describes the proposed 
model in detail.  Chapter four presents the simulation and results. 












There have been different approaches to define trust. Trust, in general, 
is a directional relationship between two entities and plays a major 
role in building a relationship between nodes in a network. Even 
though trust has been formalized as a computational model, it still 
means different things for different research communities. For 
example, the problem of defining trust metrics and trust relationship 
has been extensively studied for public key authentication 
[77][78][79], electronic commerce [80], as well as in P2P networks 
[81]. In some of these schemes, discrete or continuous numerical 
values are assigned to measure the level of trust [78][79][80]. For 
example, in [81], an entity’s opinion about the trustworthiness of a 
certificate is described by a continuous value in [0,1]. In [79], a triplet 
in [0, 1] is assigned to measure the trustworthiness where the elements 
in the triplet represent belief, disbelief, and uncertainty respectively. 
In [81], discrete integers are used. In [82] failed and selfish behaviors 
in ad hoc networks are studied.  
The reputation of an entity has been defined as an expectation of its 
behavior based on other entities’ observations or information about 
the entity’s past behavior within a specific context at a given time 
[83]. In case of a MANET, the reputation of a node refers to how good 
the node is in terms of its contribution to routing activities in the 
network. 
The distributed trust model proposed by Abdul-Rahman et al. uses a 
recommendation protocol to exchange trust-related information [84]. 
The trust relationships are assumed to be unidirectional between two 
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entities. The recommendation protocol works by requesting a trust 
value in a target node with respect to a particular classifier. When the 
response arrives, an evaluation function is used to compute the overall 
trust value in the target. The protocol also allows recommendation 
refreshing and revocation. The model is suited for systems that are 
less formal and temporary in nature, e.g., some ad hoc commercial 
transactions. 
The resurrecting duckling security protocol proposed by Stajano et al. 
is particularly suited for devices without display and embedded 
devices that are too weak for public-key operations [85]. 
The authentication problem is solved by a secure and transient 
association between two devices establishing a master-slave 
relationship. The association is secure because the master and the 
slave share a common secret, and it is transient because it can be 
terminated by the master at any point of time. 
Kong et al. have proposed a trust building scheme for ad hoc networks 
that is similar to the pretty good privacy (PGP) web of trust concept 
[96]. However, unlike PGP it has no central certificate directory. In 
order to find the public key of a remote user, a local user makes use of 
the Hunter algorithm [97] on the merged certificate repository to build 
certificate chain(s). 
Eshenauer et al. have proposed a trust establishment mechanism for 
MANETs [86]. In this scheme, a node in the network can generate 
trust evidence about any other node. When a principal generates a 
piece of trust evidence, it signs the evidence with its own private key, 
specifying the lifetime and makes it available to other through the 
network. A principal node may revoke a piece of evidence it produced 
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by generating a revocation certificate for that piece of evidence and 
making it available to others, at any time before the evidence expires. 
A principal can get disconnected after distributing trust evidence. 
Similarly, a producer of trust evidence does not have to be reachable 
at the time its evidence is being evaluated. Evidences can be replicated 
across various nodes to guarantee availability. Although the scheme 
seems conceptually sound, the authors have provided no details about 
any performance evaluations. 
Among the more recent works, Repantis et al. have proposed a 
decentralized trust management middleware for ad hoc, peer-to-peer 
networks based on reputation of the nodes [87]. In this scheme, the 
reputation information of each peer is stored in its neighborhood and 
piggybacked on its replies. 
In the trust-based data management scheme proposed by Patwardhan 
et al., mobile nodes access distributed information, storage and 
sensory resources available in pervasive computing environment [88]. 
The authors have taken a holistic approach that considers data, trust, 
security, and privacy issues and utilizes a collaborative mechanism 
that provides trustworthy data management platform in a MANET. 
Sun et al have presented a framework to quantitatively measure trust, 
model trust propagation, and defend trust evaluation system against 
malicious attacks [39]. The attacks against trust evaluation are 
identified and defense techniques have been proposed. 
Baras and Jiang have presented a trust management scheme for self-
organized ad hoc networks, where the nodes share trust information 
only with their neighbors [93]. For establishing and maintaining trust 
among the neighbors, the authors have proposed a voting mechanism. 
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Chang et al. have proposed a trust-based scheme for multicast 
communication in a MANET [91]. In a multicast MANET, a sender 
node sends packets to several receiving nodes in a multicast session. 
Since the membership in a multicast group changes frequently in a 
MANET, the issues of supporting secure authentication and 
authorization in a multicast MANET is very critical. The proposed 
scheme involves a two-step secure authentication method. First, an 
ergodic continuous Markov chain is used to determine the trust value 
of each one-hop neighbor. Second, a node with the highest trust value 
is selected as the certificate authority (CA) server. For the sake of 
reliability, the node with the second highest trust value is selected as 
the backup CA server. The analytical trust value of each mobile node 
is found to be very close to that observed in the simulation under 
various scenarios. The speed of the convergence of the analytical trust 
value shows that the analytical results are independent of the initial 
values and the trust classes. 
Sun et al. have presented trust as a measure of uncertainty [92]. Using 
the theory of entropy, the authors have developed a few techniques to 
compute trust values from certain observations. In addition, trust 
models – entropy-based and probability-based, presented to solve the 
concatenation and multi-path trust propagation problems in a 
MANET. 
Sen et al. have proposed a self-organized trust establishment scheme 
for nodes in a large-scale MANET in which a trust initiator is 
introduced during the  network bootstrapping phase [93]. It has been 
proven theoretically and shown by simulation that the new nodes 
joining the network have high probability of successful authentication 
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even when a large proportion of the existing nodes leave the network 
at any instant of time. A distributed intrusion detection system has 
been proposed in [94], where local anomaly detection is utilized to 
make a more accurate networkwide (i.e. global) detection using a 
cooperation detection algorithm among the nodes. 
Cooperation Of Nodes-Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks 
(CONFIDANT) is a security model based on selective altruism and 
utilitarianism proposed by Buchegger and Boudec to make 
misbehaviour unattractive in MANETs [95]. It is a distributed, 
symmetric reputation model that uses both first-hand and second-hand 
information for computation of reputation values. CONFIDANT uses 
dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol for routing and assumes that 
promiscuous mode of operation is possible. The misbehaving nodes 
are punished by isolating them from accessing the network resources. 
Although researchers usually assume that nodes collaborate in ad hoc 
networks, it is not so obvious that this collaboration exists in practical 
networks. Each node must forward packets for other nodes and spend 
its energy without receiving any direct gain for this act. There is no 
real incentive for nodes to participate in the routing and forwarding 
process. Yu and Liu [52] state that before ad hoc networks can be 
successfully deployed in autonomous ways, the issues of cooperation 
stimulation and security must be resolved first. Several works propose 
mechanisms to stimulate the cooperation among nodes. Their goal is 
to avoid selfish and malicious behavior to guarantee the right 
implementation of routing and forwarding tasks by all nodes of the 
network [53-59]. Nevertheless, all these works are restricted to 
stimulate the collaboration of nodes to relay traffic for other nodes. 
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We are concerned with all kinds of distributed mechanisms and 
applications, such as authentication, key distribution, access control, 
and management. 
In general, the trust models in ad hoc networks try to protect or 
enforce the two basic functions of the network layer: routing and 
packet forwarding [60]. Sun et al. [61] investigate the benefits of 
using trust models in distributed networks, the vulnerabilities in trust 
establishment methods, and the defense mechanisms. 
Several works propose monitoring schemes to generate trust values 
describing the trustworthiness, reliability, or competence of individual 
nodes. Theodora kopoulos and Baras [62] analyze the issue of 
evaluating the trust level as a generalization of the shortest-path 
problem in an oriented graph, where the edges correspond to the 
opinion that a node has about other node. They consider that nodes 
use just their own information to establish their opinions. The opinion 
of each node includes the trust level and its precision. The main goal 
is to enable nodes to indirectly build trust relationships using 
exclusively monitored information. 
Sun et al. [63] have developed a framework capable of measuring the 
trust level and propagating it through the network in order to make 
routing more secure and to assist intrusion detection systems. The 
framework includes a defense mechanism against malicious nodes. 
The authors use a probabilistic model based on the uncertainty of a 
neighbor to execute one specific action and consider only the 
monitoring information. 
He et al. [64] propose an architecture for stimulating the collaboration 
based on the reputation of nodes. The system is based only on the 
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monitored information to evaluate the reputation of nodes. The goal is 
to detect and to punish nodes that do not participate in the routing 
process. 
The main difference of these works and our trust model is that they 
use only the node own experience, namely, the monitored information 
on the trust evaluation process. Our trust model considers the 
monitored information and the recommendations of neighbors to 
achieve a faster convergence time and an accurate trust level for each 
neighbor. 
In probabilistic-based models, a common approach consists of using 
Bayesian networks, which is a probabilistic tool that provides a 
flexible means of dealing with probabilistic problems involving 
causality [65]. Buchegger and Le Boudec [66] investigate the trade-off 
between robustness and efficiency of reputation systems in mobile ad 
hoc networks. A mechanism based on Bayesian statistics is used to 
filter slanderer nodes. 
The proposed system considers the monitored information and the 
recommendation of other nodes to compute the reputation of a specific 
node. They show that taking into account the recommendations of 
other nodes can speed up the process of discovery of malicious nodes. 
Chinni et al. [67] offer a distributed trust model for certificate 
revocation in ad hoc networks. This model allows trust to be built 
based on the interactions between nodes, using monitored information. 
Furthermore, trust in a node is defined not only in terms of its 
potential for maliciousness, but also in terms of the quality of the 
service it provides. The trust level of nodes where there is little or no 
history of interactions is determined by recommendations from other 
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nodes. If the nodes in the network are selfish, trust is obtained by an 
exchange of portfolios. Bayesian networks form the underlying basis 
for this model. 
Another approach consists of using linear functions to infer trust. 
Pirzada and McDonald [68] propose another trust model for ad hoc 
networks to compute the trustworthiness of different routes. Nodes 
can use this information as an additional metric on routing algorithms. 
Although the authors present an interesting approach, the model 
presents 1 relies on using the promiscuous mode, ignoring the energy 
constraints of mobile nodes. Finally, it requires each node to store 
information for all other nodes in the network, which is not scalable. 
Liu et al. [73] propose a trust model to ad hoc networks based on the 
distribution of threat reports to interested nodes. The goal is to make 
security-aware routing decisions, where nodes use the trust level as an 
additional metric for routing packets. The authors present different 
approaches for the trust level calculation. Nevertheless, they assume 
that nodes cooperate with each other which is not always the case. 
They also assume that all nodes are capable of detecting malicious 
behavior by means of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). This 
assumption leads to high energy consumption, which is clearly not an 
appropriate option for ad hoc networks. All the trust level dynamics is 
based on the reports provided by the IDS. 
Yan et al. [74, 75] propose a security solution for ad hoc networks 
based on a trust model. They suggest using a linear function to 
calculate the trust according to a particular action. The function 
considers different factors that can affect the trust level, including 
intrusion black lists, previous experience statistics, and 
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recommendations. Nonetheless, the influence of such factors on the 
trust evaluation is not defined. Although mentioning general trust 
concepts, the work focus on specific routing issues. 
Pirzada and McDonald [76] propose another trust model for ad hoc 
networks to compute the reliability of different routes. Nodes can use 
this information as an additional metric on routing algorithms. The 
authors propose an extension to DSR protocol which applies their trust 
model in order to find trustworthy routes. Although the authors 
present an interesting approach, the model presents several 
disadvantages. For instance, it is restricted to DSR so far, it relies 
on using promiscuous mode ignoring the energy constrains of mobile 
nodes, and it stores a significant amount of information, since it keeps 
information for all nodes in the network. 
Virendra et al. [71] present a trust-based architecture that allows nodes 
to make decisions on establishing keys with other nodes and forming 
groups of trust. Their scheme considers trust self-evaluation and 
recommendation of other nodes to compute trust. Their trust self-
evaluation is based on monitoring nodes and a challenge-response 
system. Some authors present trust models specifically designed to 
work with a particular routing protocol. Komathy and Narayanasamy 
[69] add a trust-based evolutionary game model to the AODV routing 
protocol in order to cope with selfish nodes. 
Kostoulas et al. [71] propose a decentralized trust model to improve 
reliable information dissemination in large-scale disasters. The 
proposed model includes a distributed recommendation scheme, 
incorporated into an existing membership maintenance service for ad 
28  
hoc networks. In addition, trust based information is propagated 
through a nature-inspired activation spreading mechanism. 
The main differences of our work from all the related work are that 
nodes interact only with neighbors. Neighborhood interactions imply 
low resource consumption and minimize the effect of false 
recommendations. Another important issue is the introduction of the 
concept of relationship maturity in our model which improves the 
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A Scalable Trust Management scheme for MANETs  
Mobile ad hoc networks MANETs, lack the infrastructure seen in 
managed wireless networks. As a result, nodes must play the roles of 
router, server, and client, compelling them to cooperate for the correct 
operation of the network [1]. Specific protocols have been proposed 
for ad hoc networks considering not only its peculiar characteristics, 
but also a perfect cooperation among nodes. In general, it is assumed 
that all nodes behave according to the application and protocol 
specifications. This assumption, however, may be false, due to 
resource restrictions (e.g., low battery power) or malicious behavior. 
Assuming a perfect behavior can lead to unforeseen pitfalls, such as 
low network efficiency, high resource consumption, and vulnerability 
to attacks. Therefore, a mechanism that allows a node to infer the 
trustworthiness of other nodes in an ad hoc network becomes 
necessary [2],[3]. 
 Providing a trust metric to each node is not only useful when nodes 
misbehave, but also when nodes exchange information. 
According to the paradigm of autonomic networks [72], a node should 
be capable of self-configuring, self-managing, and self-learning by 
means of collecting local information and exchanging information 
with its neighbors. Thus, it is important to communicate only with 
trustworthy neighbors, since communicating with misbehaving nodes 
can compromise the autonomy of ad hoc networks. 
The ability of assessing the trust level of a neighbors brings several 
advantages: 
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First: A node can detect and isolate malicious behaviors, avoiding 
relaying packets to malicious neighbors.  
Secondly: cooperation is stimulated by selecting the neighbors with 
higher trust levels. 
This flexible trust model is based on the concept of human trust 
principles, which consider the previous individual experiences 
(judging the actions performed by other nodes) and on the 
recommendations of others (experiences of other nodes), a key 
concept introduced is the relationship maturity, which is the age of the 
relationship between two nodes. This concept allows nodes to give 
more importance to recommendations sent by long-term neighbors 
than recommendations sent by new neighbors. Hence improve the 
efficiency of the proposed model for mobile scenarios.  
3.1 THE TRUST MODEL  
The basic idea is to build a trust model that provides nodes with a 
mechanism to evaluate the trust of its neighbors. A node assigns a so-
called trust level for each neighbor, which represents how trustworthy 
each neighbor is. In this work trust is defined as the value that reflects 
the behavior history that a node has about a specific neighbor. This 
information is used as an expectation of its neighbor future behavior. 
We extend this definition to include the recommendations of others as 
well. Therefore, similar to the concept of human trust, the 
computation of the trust level of a given neighbor is based on previous 
experiences and also on the opinion of other neighbors.  
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By previous experiences, we mean that a node keeps track of the good 
and bad actions taken by its neighbors. A bad action is the one that 
does not correspond to the expected behavior. As a result, previous  
experiences allow a node to have a personal “opinion” about all its 
neighbors. 
Neighbor nodes can further share their own opinions in order to 
improve the trust level evaluation, as shown in figure 3.1. The 
transmission of a personal opinion about a specific node  is defined as 
a recommendation. Neighbor nodes take into account this 
recommendation while calculating the trust level for node . The main 
goal of the recommendations is to compensate for the lack of 
monitoring capabilities due to resource constraints.  
Usually, a node is not able to observe the complete behavior of a 
given neighbor over time. Recommendations from other neighbors are 
useful in this case for an accurate trust level assignment. Moreover, 
the use of recommendations can speed up the convergence of the trust 
evaluating process, as showed in chapter four. For that purpose, we 
introduce the concept of relationship maturity, which is based on the 
age of the relationship between two nodes. This concept allows nodes 
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to give more importance to recommendations sent by longterm 
neighbors rather than short-term neighbors. Nodes use the 
Contribution Exchange Protocol (CEP) to send and receive 
recommendations. Figure 3.2. illustrates an example of a 
recommendation. Nodes connected by a dotted arrow are neighbors 
and the number indicates for how long they know each other, namely, 
the relationship maturity parameter. A normal arrow represents a 
recommendation and the letter indicates the target node. 
First thing to notice is that recommendations concern one common 
neighbor of different nodes. In that case, node  is a common 
neighbor of node , , and . Node  and  send their 
recommendation about node  to node . Node  will consider the 
recommendation from node  more important than the one received 
from node  because node   has a longer relationship with node . It 
is worth mentioning that recommendations sent by node  about node 
 will be ignored by node , , and  because node  is not a 
neighbor of . Each node assigns a trust level for each neighbor. A 
continuous representation for the trust level is maintained, ranging 
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from 0 to 1 where 0 means the least reliable node and 1 means the 
most reliable node.  
The proposed model can be divided in two distinct planes as shown in 
Fig. 3.3.  
The Learning plane is responsible for gathering and converting 
information into knowledge. For instance, this plan is responsible for 
monitoring the behavior of each neighbor. The Trust plane defines 
how to assess the trust level of each neighbor using the knowledge 
information provided by the Learning plan and the information 
exchanged with neighbors. Both plans can interact with all layers of 
the TCP/IP model. Therefore, the learning process considers 
information from all layers and the trust information generated by the 
Trust plane is also available for all layers. Since we take into account 
not only malicious nodes but also selfish behaviors due to resource 
constraints, a trust value is associated to a particular scope, like 
forwarding packets, sending recommendations, and other application-
specific scopes.  
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Therefore, we consider that a node might behave differently according 
to the scope and the resource constraints. Consequently, the type of 
information to be collected by the Learning plan depends on the 
defined scopes. For instance, for the routing process, the Learning 
plan must observe if neighbors respond to route requests, if they send 
false routes, etc. 
The Learning plan relies on three basic components as displayed in 
Fig. 3.4. The Behavior Monitor observes neighbors in order to collect 
information about their behavior. It must be able to notice other 
nodes’ actions and transmit them to the Classifier. In ad hoc networks, 
nodes might perform several actions, like sending packets, forwarding 
packets, responding to routing messages, among others. For this, each 
node periodically broadcasts its hello messages, containing the list of 
neighbors known to the node and their link status. The hello messages 
are received by all one-hop neighbors, but are not forwarded. They are 
broadcast at a low frequency determined by the refreshing period 
Hello Interval (the default value is two seconds). These hello 
messages permit each node to absorb the knowledge of its neighbors 
up to two hops. On the basis of this information, each node performs 
the selection of its multipoint relays. 
The Behavior Monitor also indicates the presence of new neighbors to 
the Recommendation Manager. The Classifier is the component 
dedicated to reason about the information collected by the Monitor. 
The Classifier decides the quality of an action according to a 
previously defined classification. The Classifier then sends its verdict 
to the Experience Calculator. Finally, the Experience Calculator 
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estimates a partial trust value for a given node based on the 
information received by the Classifier.  
The trust plan is composed of five main components as depicted in 
Fig. 3.4.  
Each node must keep a main Trust Table which contains the trust level 
for each neighbor. Additionally, a node can also store the opinion of 
its neighbors about their common neighbors on the Trust Table. Each 
entry on the Trust Table is associated with a timeout. Therefore, an 
entry is erased from the Trust Table whenever the node associated to 
that entry is no longer a neighbor or when it expires. All the 
recommendations related to that entry are erased as well. In our 
model, nodes can also keep an additional table that is not mandatory. 
The Auxiliary Trust Table (ATT) contains the variance of each trust 
level and for how long they keep that information, which indicates 
relationship maturity. The goal of the Auxiliary Trust Table is to 
supply nodes with additional information that improves the trust level 
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evaluation. Nevertheless, this trust evaluation improvement requires 
more energy consumption and nodes with power or storage constraints 
can choose not to implement the entire trust system. Thus, in order to 
cope with the heterogeneity that characterizes ad hoc networks [12], 
we define three operation modes: simple, intermediate, and advanced:  
 Nodes with low power/storage capacity operate in the simple 
mode, in which they use just the main Trust Table.  
 Nodes with a medium capacity operate in the intermediate 
mode, in which they use the main trust table and also store the 
trust table of neighbor nodes. 
 Nodes with high capacity operate in the advanced mode, which 
is the same as intermediate mode, but additionally implement 
the ATT to keep track of additional parameters, like maturity, 
accuracy, and location. 
The amount of saved resource and the accuracy of trust level for each 
operation mode depends on the monitoring, which is application-
specific, and whether the CEP protocol is used or not. we consider that 
nodes operate in the advanced mode. 
The Recommendation Manager is responsible for receiving, sending, 
and storing recommendations. The interactions between the Network 
Interface and the Recommendation Manager are performed by the 
Contribution Exchange Protocol (CEP). The reception of a 
recommendation involves two actions. First, the recommendation is 
stored in the Auxiliary Trust Table (ATT) and then it is forwarded to 
the Recommendation Calculator component. The Recommendation 
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Calculator computes all the recommendations for a given neighbor 
and determines a trust value based on the opinions of other nodes. 
This value is passed to the Trust Calculator component. 
The Trust Calculator evaluates the trust level based on the trust values 
received from the Experience Calculator (individual experiences) and 
the Recommendation Calculator (neighbor recommendations). The 
Trust Calculator also notifies the Recommendation Manager the need 
of sending a trust recommendation advertisement. Our proposition 
only requires interactions with neighbors and only stores information 
about neighbors. This is an important feature for mobile ad hoc 
networks composed by portable devices that have energy, processing, 
and memory restrictions [13]  
3.2  Trust level evaluation 
We define the trust level evaluation from node  about node ,	 , 
as a weighted sum of its own trust (monitor) and the recommendations 
of neighbors, similar to Virendra et al. [14]. The fundamental equation 
is:
	
1									,bRαbQα1bT aaa   
where the variable Qa b , that ranges from [0,1], represents the 
capability of a node a to evaluate the trust level of its neighbor b 
based on its own information (observations). and Ra b  that ranges 
from [0,1], is the aggregate value of the recommendations from all 
other neighbors, explained in Section 3.3. The variable that ranges 
from [0, 1], is a parameter that allows nodes to choose the most 
relevant factor. The value of Qa b  is given by:
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where  represents the trust value obtained by the judgment of the 
actions of a neighbor performed by the Classifier component, and the 
variable Ta b  gives the last trust level value stored in the Trust Table. 
The variable , that ranges from [0, 1], allows different weights for 
the factors of the equation, selecting which factor is the more relevant 
at a given moment. 
Equations 1 and 2 describe how the Trust Calculator combines the 
information from the Experience Calculator Ea b , the 
Recommendation Calculator Ra b , and the Trust Table Ta b  to 
derive a trust level.  
3.3 Recommendation computation 
The trust level calculation considers the recommendations of 
neighbors obtained by the Contribution Exchange Protocol (CEP) 
described in Section 3.5. Ra b , in Equation 1, represents the 
aggregate trust that the neighbors of node  have on node .  
First, node  defines a set Ka, the group Ka defines the nodes from 
which recommendations will be considered. Let Na be the set of 
neighbors of node a that includes all nodes known for a period of 
time. Ka is a subset of the neighbors of node a comprising all nodes 
that satisfy two basic conditions : 
 Theire trust level is above a certain threshold (Tth).  
 Theire relationship maturity factor are above certain threshold 
(Mth).  
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The subset Ka can be defined as follows: 
.Ka thth MMa iTTa i|Na	i    
The recommendation, Ra(b), is defined as the weighted average of the 
recommendations from all nodes  ∈	  about node . The weight for 
a recommendation from a neighbor  is the trust level that node  has 














          
The relevance of the recommendation of other nodes is strongly 
related to the selection of Ka. The more trustworthy Ka is the more 
useful the recommendation of others is. The recommendations 
considers not only the trust level of other nodes Ti(b), but also the 
accuracy ( ) and the relationship maturity ( ). The accuracy of a trust 
level is based on the standard deviation, similar to Theodorakopoulos 
and Baras [15]. The value in the Trust Table of node i	 regarding node 
 is associated to a standard deviation i( ), which refers to the 
variations of the trust level that node i	has observed about node . We 
use  as a random variable with a normal distribution to represent the 
uncertainty of the recommendation. It can be expressed as:  
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where S represents the set of the k last trust level samples about a 
specific node. The value of  represents the average of these k 
samples. The parameter  i b  tells us the confidence of the trust level. 
A high value fot  i b   has two meanings:   
 Either the node is not able to assess the trust value with 
accuracy or,  
 The node whose trust level is being estimated is unstable. 
The recommendation of node ( ) about node ( ) is weighted by Mi b , 
which defines the maturity of the relationship between nodes  and , 
measured at node( ). The relationship maturity is a measure of the time 
that two nodes have known each other. We use the relationship 
maturity to give more relevance to the nodes that know the evaluated 
neighbor for a longer time. Accordingly, we assume that the trust level 
of a more mature neighbor (older neighbor) has already converged to 
a common value within the network and therefore its opinion should 
be more relevant than the opinion of a new neighbor. It is important to 
notice that maturity is only considered between the recommender, 
node , and the node that is being evaluated, node b , as illustrated 
in Fig. 7.  
Malicious nodes can implement an attack exploiting the concept of 
relationship maturity by attributing fake trust levels. In order to 
minimize this effect, each node defines a maximum relationship 
maturity value , which represents an upper bound for the 
relationship maturity. This value is based on the average time for 
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which a node knows its neighbors.Accordingly, we can express Mi(b) 
as:  
.MiElse,, Miif, (b)(b) MM	Mi maxmaxb   
3.4 The First Trust Assignment     
We divide the trust scheme in two distinct phases. In the initial phase, 
nodes first meet and assign a trust level to each other. The second 
phase is the trust level update, which assumes that the nodes have 
already met each other. When a node first meets a specific neighbor, it 
assigns an initial level of trust to this neighbor. The first trust 
assignment depends on several network parameters, such as mobility, 
location of nodes, and its current state. We classify the first trust 
assignment strategy as prudent or optimistic. In the prudent strategy 
the node does not trust strangers and considers that every new 
neighbor as a possible threat to the network. As a consequence, the 
node assigns a low value of trust for the new neighbor. On the other 
hand, the optimistic strategy assumes that every node is reliable until 
proven otherwise. In such case, the node associates a high level of 
trust for new neighbors. Right in the middle of these two strategies, 
one could think of a moderate strategy, in which the node assigns an 
intermediate level of trust for strangers.  
Different situations might demand distinct strategies. For example, if a   
has already a significant number of reliable neighbors it can adopt a 
prudent strategy because it does not need new reliable neighbors. 
Further, the addition of a new neighbor might not significantly 
increase the probability of augmenting its satisfaction level. On the 
other hand, in a network where topology periodically changes and 
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neighbor relationships are ephemeral, a node can opt for the optimistic 
strategy. In hostile environments, nodes might want to adopt the 
prudent strategy whereas in well-known cordial environments nodes 
can select the friendly strategy. 
The first trust assignment can also take into account the 
recommendation of known neighbors weighted by their trust levels. 
For a node  to calculate the first trust level of a node , we propose 
the same approach as Equation 1, but replacing the term that reflects 
its own experience by the First Trust Value, (Fa), given by: 
 
6														b ,αα1b RFT aaa                 
where  is the value used by node  according to the adopted 
strategy, Ra b  is the aggregate recommendation of neighbors about 
node , and  is the weight factor that allows us to give more 
relevance to the desired parameter.   
3.5 The Contribution Exchange Protocol  
The recommendation from node i	∈	ka includes the trust level Ti(b) of 
the target node, its accuracy i(b) and for how long they know each 
other, Mi(b). For a node that does not implement the Auxiliary Trust 
Table, the recommendation includes just the trust level Ti(b). We 
propose the Contribution Exchange Protocol (CEP) as a part of the 
Recommender Manager in Fig. 3.4. This protocol allows nodes to 
exchange recommendations among them and only considers 
interactions with neighbors, which significantly simplifies the 
protocol. Thus, all messages are transmitted by one hop broadcasts 
43  
avoiding flooding in multihop communications. When using IP to 
broadcast the message, the Time to Live (TTL) field is set to 1.  
The protocol is composed of three messages:  
 Trust Request TREQ  message. 
 Trust Reply TREP  message. 
 Trust Advertisement TA  message.  
When nodes first meet, each one broadcasts a Trust Request TREQ  
message to their neighbors with the IP address of the new neighbor as 
the target node. All neighbors receive the TREQ   message and check 
if the target node is a neighbor or not. Nodes that have the target node 
as a neighbor, will answer with a Trust Reply TREP   message, which 
contains the recommendation about the target node, after waiting for a 
random period of time  to avoid collisions and to wait for 
receiving other TREQs .  




























We also define a TREP threshold under which it will not answer the 
TREQ. The threshold is based on the trust level of the requesting node. 
This strategy reduces the effect of non trustworthy nodes that 
repeatedly send TREQ messages. Before sending a TREQ message, a 
node waits for a specific period of time  trying to gather the 
maximum number of new neighbors. After , the node will request 
the recommendations of all the	q new neighbors it has collected. Thus, 
instead of sending q TREQ messages it sends just one with q node IDs. 
After sending a TREQ, the trust requesting node will wait for a specific 
timeout period to receive the TREPs from its neighbors. If a node does 
not receive any TREP, it ignores the recommendation of its neighbors 
by choosing 	 	0 in Equation 5. 
During a trust level update, the Trust Level TL  may change. If the 
trust level changes significantly, the node sends a Trust Advertisement 
TA  message to notify its neighbors about the change. In order to 
prevent nodes from sending TA messages for every change in the Trust 
Level, we defined the TA threshold π  as a minimum difference, 
between the new TL and the TL in the last recommendation sent, above 
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which nodes must announce the new TL by sending a TA. The 
reception of a TA message does not imply a recalculation of the trust 
level to reduce the effect of malicious nodes that send TAs to trigger 
trust level recalculation in other nodes. The recalculation is triggered 
by the perception of an action.  
3.6 Authentication mechanism 
An authentication mechanism is essential, because malicious nodes 
may pretend to be another node. Nevertheless, our model does not 
require a sophisticated authentication mechanism. Nodes do not need 
to know nor recognize any other node a priori, namely, a node does 
not need to identify a new neighbor when it arrives. In our system, 
nodes must be able to identify neighbors that they already know. 
Therefore, there is no need of a certification authority. Hence, nodes 
must exchange identifiers when they first meet and keep a neighbor 
identifier during all the period they remain in the radio range of each 
other. Thus, a pair of public/private key for each node is enough to 
allow our mechanism to work adequately. It is important to notice that 
there is no correct identifier and a node might use different identifiers. 
However, the Sybil attack is not a real problem for the proposed 
mechanism, because nodes must behave in order to have a high trust 
level. Therefore, even though a node may have multiple identities, its 
neighbors will be able to identify the benign ones, and will avoid 
interacting with the malicious ones Nevertheless, authentication 




3.7  THE TRUST MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
Home made simulator has been developed, which is specifically 
designed for this model, in order to evaluate and identify the main 
characteristics of the proposed model. In ad hoc networks, nodes can 
perform several actions, like sending packets, forwarding packets, 
responding to routing messages, sending recommendations, among 
others. The set of performed actions define the node’s behavior. 
Therefore, the Learning plan monitors the neighbor’s actions trying to 
evaluate their behavior. In our simulator, each node performs good 
actions and/or bad actions. The time between two consecutive actions 
performed by a node is exponentially distributed (mean = 5 time 
units). The kind of action that will be performed depends solely on the 
nature of the node. A node with a nature equals to 0.8 means that it 
performs eight good actions out of ten. The nature of a node ranges 
from 0 to 1. Trustworthy nodes have nature equals to 1 while 
untrustworthy nodes have nature equals to 0. The nature is used as a 
reference of the ideal global trust level that a node should receive by 
its neighbors. We use it here as a metric to evaluate how close the 
measured global trust level of a node actually gets from its nature. We 
emulate the Behavior Monitor (Fig.3.4) by introducing in our 
simulator the concept of perception. The perception indicates the 
probability of noticing a certain action. Each Behavior Monitor 
presents its own perception. Therefore, a node with a perception of 0.6 
is able of noticing 60% of all the actions performed by its neighbors. 
The Behavior Monitor passes all the perceived actions to the Classifier 
without knowing its nature. In our simulator, we assume a perfect 
Classifier, which means that the judgment of an action always 
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matches with the original nature of the action. It is worth to mention 
that noticing and judging an action does not imply using promiscuous 
mode. We believe that a node should be able to decide whether it will 
use promiscuous mode or not based on its own constraints and needs. 
Thus, nodes may decide not to use promiscuous mode at the expense 
of having a lower perception. Therefore, the perception parameter can 
reflect nodes that operate in simple and intermediate modes. Finally, 
the judgments are transmitted to the Experience Calculator. For the 
Experience Calculator, we propose a simple approach which consists 
of evaluating the trust value based on a set of the last 	 perceived 
actions from the same neighbor. This implies the existence of a 
minimum number of actions 	 that a node must notice from each 
neighbor before having a concrete opinion about them, based on its 
own experience. It means that during the initial phase of first contact, 
nodes use just the recommendations of its neighbors to evaluate the 
trust level of the new one. The minimum number of perceived actions 
is crucial for the accuracy of the measure. A higher perception allows 
a more accurate result. At the same time, a large number of necessary 
initial actions leads to a longer delay for assessing the trust value for 
new neighbors, leading to a higher convergence time. For the 
simulations, we assume the Experience Calculator considers the last 








Simulation and results 
Home made simulator has been developed, which is specifically 
designed for this model, in order to evaluate and identify the main 
characteristics of the proposed model. 
Software Specification: 
 Operating System  : Windows 98/2000/XP  
 Language   : C#.NET, including multi-  
                                                            threading and networking  
                                                            libraries 
  Server   : IIS  
 Framework   : V2.0 
Hardware Specification: 
 RAM    :  256 MB and above 
 Processor   : P3 and above 
 Hard Disk    : 40 GB and above 
Our concern is different from other works that focus strictly on 
security issues. We focus on providing nodes a way of having an 
opinion about their neighbors. This opinion governs the interaction 
among nodes. The goal is to make nodes capable of making their own 
decisions based on the autonomic paradigm.  
So the main goal here is to evaluate and analyze: 
 The influence of the number of neighbors. 
 The first trust assignment strategy. 
 The variation of parameters alpha and perception. 
 Analyzing the impact of the relationship maturity. 
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 Evaluating the performance of the CEP protocol.   
The simulation scenario consists of 32 nodes with 250 m transmission 
range, which are randomly placed in a 150 m × 150 m area. Under 
these circumstances, all nodes can communicate directly to each other, 
characterizing a single hop ad hoc network. 
We chose alpha = beta = perception = 0.5. These are the standard 
values for the simulations. All nodes have the same nature. 
Figure 4.1 presents the time response of the average trust level from 
all neighbors about a specific node. We observe in Figure 4.1.a that 
the trust level value begins in a certain level but tends to the expected 
trust level. The expected (correct) level is the nature of the node that is 
being analyzed. After a specific amount of time, the curve oscillates 
around the correct value. Because according to: 
 
6														b ,αα1b RF aaaT   
 Initially there is no recommendations, so the trust level begin at 
Fa,which is in the optimistic strategy equal to 0.9. and after receiving 
recommendation it tends to the expected trust level which is equal to 
the nature of of the node = 0.2. 
Thus, we verify the existence of a transient period and stationary 
period. In the transient period Fig. 4.1.a, nodes are trying to 
approximate to the expected value, while in the stationary period Fig. 












In the following figures, instead of presenting the average trust level, 
we present the average error of the trust value evaluated, that is, the 
difference between the trust level and the correct value. At the end, the 
ideal result is a curve that reaches the value zero, which means that 
there is no error between the average trust values calculated by the 
neighbors and the value of the nature of the node.  
In Figure 4.2, nodes adopt an optimistic strategy and we vary the 
number of neighbors. The nature is set to 0,2. We can notice that the 
greater is the number of neighbors the closer to zero is the error. It 
occurs due to the fact that augmenting the number of neighbors means 
increasing the number of recommendations, which implies a greater 





Figure 4.3, shows the influence of the parameter alpha on the trust 
level evaluation. According to Eq: 1			b ,Raαbaα1bTa  Q  
Decreasing alpha implies that the recommendation of other nodes has 
a minor effect in the trust level calculation where reducing the effict 
of the experience. 
 
Figure 4.4 reveals the effect of the perception on the trust level 
evaluation. It is clear that the perception is strong related to the 
duration of the transient period. It occurs due to the existence of a 
minimum number of actions from each neighbor for nodes to consider 




With low perception the importance of the number of neighbors to 
reach closer to the expected value is clearer. It means that the lowest is 
the perception, the lowest is the probability of noticing the real nature 
of a neighbor by the judgment of its actions. On the other hand, a low 
perception can be compensated by a larger number of neighbors as 
shown in figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.6 presents the influence of the nature on the trust level 
evaluation.  That the nature does not affect significantly the duration 





At last, we analyze the impact of the relationship maturity in the 
evaluation of the trust level, For this purpose, we present a simple 
scenario with a specific mobility pattern, which consists of 21 nodes 
with 250 m transmission range, which are placed in a 1000m × 400m  
area, as shown in Fig. 4.7. The distance between nodes is 150 m.  
 
All nodes have the same nature equals to 0.2, and we assume the  
perception is equal to 0.5, and the first trust assignment strategy is 
optimistic, hence the new node assigned a trust level equal to 0.9. 
These are the standard values for the simulations which chosed as the 
worst case parameters. 
To measure the impact of the relationship maturity, we assume node   
8 going to move to zone F2, the same zone as node 12 ( scenario m2). 
We consider the trust level evaluation of node 8 by node 6. Therefore, 
when node 8 arrives at the destination zone F2, it has no old 
neighbors, node 6 will treat all the recommendations about node 8 as 
the same (no maturity used). The same scenario happen when node 8 
moves to zone D2, the same zone as node 10 ( scenario m1). But if we 
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consider the trust level evaluation of node 8 by node 4, hence it has 3 
old neighbors (node2, node9, node16).  
Without the relationship maturity, when node 4 receives the 
recommendations of its neighbors, it will treat them all the same 
manner.  
Using the relationship maturity, node 4 gives more importance to the 
recommendations of (node 2, node 9, node 16) which is the oldest 
neighbors of node 8. 
 
It can be noticed in Fig.4.8 that the transient is shorter with the 
relationship maturity. We can have almost the same effect of 
increasing alpha just by using the relationship maturity.  
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The figure also shows that with a greater alpha the impact of the 
relationship maturity in the transient is more significant. It improves 
the efficiency of the system due to the fact that node 4 prioritizes the 
recommendations of its neighbors. Therefore, giving more weight to 
the recommendations from nodes that have a longer relationship with 
the target node is more effective. Although node 8 is not able to reach 
the stationary period, it achieves a lower Error rate than without using 
the relationship maturity.  
The Contribution Exchange Protocol (CEP) (Section 3.5) is an 
important feature in this model. In order to evaluate the performance 
of the CEP protocol a single-hop network is used, because it is a 
"local" protocol, that is, the interactions are limited to neighbors, and 
thus mobility does not have a real impact on the performance of CEP. 
The scenario consists of n nodes randomly placed in a 150 m × 150 m  
area, which means that each node has n-1 neighbors. The first trust 
value is 0.9, all nodes have a nature equals 0.2. All nodes arrive at the 
same time and try to evaluate the trust level of their neighbors. 
As we mention in section 3.5, The protocol is composed of three 
messages:  
 Trust Request (TREQ) message. 
 Trust Reply (TREP) message. 
 Trust Advertisement (TA) message  
 We believe that this is a representative scenario, since in this scenario 
all types of messages are used. The first set of simulations aims at 
evaluating the impact of the number of neighbors on the performance 
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of the CEP protocol, more specifically on the number of sent 
messages. Therefore, we vary the number of nodes n from 4 to 32. 
Figure 4.9. presents the result of the number of messages sent per 
node in this scenario. The TREQ message is sent just once when two 
nodes first meet. Thus, each node should send at most n − 1 TREQs. 
However, we implement a timer before sending a TREQ message that is 
used to collect the maximum number of TREQs in one single message. 
The timer also permits the TREQ suppression when the node receives a 
TREP during the timer period. This approach allows reducing 
significantly the number of TREQs when the neighborhood changes in 
short-term period, as in the case of a network in which nodes start 
simultaneously. Results show the effectiveness of this approach. In 
this scenario we reach more than 85% of reduction (the case with 32 
nodes).  
The TREP message is sent just once per TREP	request, which means that 
the expected number of TREPs (n − 1)(n − 2) messages. First, we 
implement the TREP as a broadcast message which is only considered 
by nodes that have sent a TREQ recently. Thus, the number of expected 
messages drop to (n − 1). Finally, we implement the same timer 
approach for the TREP. Figure 4.9 shows that for the TREP, these two 










We notice from the previous result (Fig. 4.9) that the TA message is 
more sensitive to the increase of the number of neighbors. However, 
we observe that there is no exponential increase (n))  
2
3  ( Onmostly    
and if we consider that these messages are sent at each transient 
period, we have less than one TA message per unit of time during the 
transient period. 
We can try to optimize the number of TA messages sent during the 
transient period. TA messages are sent by nodes whenever the trust 
level of a given neighbor has varied more than a certain threshold (π). 
This approach avoids sending trust level information after every 
change in the trust level of a neighbor, instead, we advertise the trust 
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level information just after a significant change compared to the last 
advertised value. 
In Fig. 4.10, we use the same scenario but with 20 nodes. it shows the 
impact of the value of π on the number of messages.  
 
The first important observation is that, as expected, TREQ and TREP 
messages are not influenced by the value of π. Second, the lower is the 
value of π, the larger is the number of TA messages and the faster is 
the transient period. An interesting result is that setting π = 0.2 does 
not reduce significantly the number of messages, comparing to π = 
0.1, because the trust level variation is smoother which leads to a 
longer transient period. Moreover, for π = 0.2 the trust evaluation 
process does not converge to the correct value (0.2). Therefore, there 
is an optimum value for π that reduces the number of TA messages 












A human-based trust assignment model for ad hoc networks have been 
proposed. It aims at building a trust relationship among nodes inspired 
by the human concept of trust. Our concern is different from other 
works that focus strictly on security issues. We focus on providing 
nodes a way of having an opinion about their neighbors. This opinion 
governs the interaction among nodes. The goal is to make nodes 
capable of making their own decisions based on the autonomic 
paradigm. The proposed model results in a utterly distributed trust 
system for ad hoc networks based on the recommendation of other 
nodes and on the own experiences of the nodes. This approach 
considers not only the trust level but also its accuracy and the 
relationship maturity. We also define the Contribution Exchange 
Protocol (CEP) that allows nodes to exchange recommendations in an 
efficient way. The system performance is analyzed through 
simulations. The results reveal the Effectiveness of the proposed 
system and show the influence of the main parameters. 
Results shows the Scalability of the proposed model, which is a key 
problem when we consider a large network size, networks of 10,000 
or even 100,000 nodes, due to the limited memory and processing 
power on mobile devices.  The proposed model improves scalability 
by restricting nodes to keep and exchange trust  information solely 






Future work includes defining and implementing a monitoring scheme 
for a specific application and applying our model to improve the 
service/application performance, as for instance, an authentication 
protocol. 
Another issue that needs more research and implementation effort is 
the selection of neighbor subset ka, we define it as: 
Mth	Ma iTthTa i|Na		i			Ka    
but node may has an upper trust level, where the maturity factor is 
low, so we need sophisticated strategy to decide the best neighbor 
subset ka. 
 Deciding the best strategy to derive Fa is not a simple task. For 
instance, Fa must take into account the level of mobility, the current 
satisfaction, the number of reliable neighbors. As choosing the best 
strategy evolves several parameters, we suggest a learning approach to 
select the strategy. This means that the Learning layer is responsible 
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